POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: RELIGIOUS EXPRESSIONS TRAJECTORIES IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND by ROZAKI, Abdur et al.
95
IKAT: The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Social Studies Vol. 3(1), 2019
Poli  cal Economy of the Muslim Middle Class in Southeast 
Asia: Religious Expression Trajectories in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand
Abdur Rozaki1
Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Indonesia
Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma2
Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Indonesia
Abd. Aziz Faiz3
Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Indonesia
 Abstract
The growth of Muslim middle class in the three Southeast Asian countries namely Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand are heavily infl uenced by each state’s poli  cal development policy as well as the growing 
phenomenon of the Muslim market as part of the global market dynamics. This paper aims to describe 
the phenomenon of state and society rela  ons in regards to policies that infl uence the growth of the 
Muslim middle class and how the market contributes to their expansion. The research shows that 
Muslim middle class in Indonesia is a result of the ever-crisscrossing force between state-driven pro-
market policies, market-driven mechanisms, and the development of informa  on technology that 
creates the demands of modern lifestyles. In terms of the Malaysian context, the Muslim middle-class 
forma  on is closely linked to a state driven policy in the form of ethnicity-based policy: an affi  rma  ve 
policy to strengthen the Malays, which is iden  cal with Islam. While for the case of Muslim middle 
class in Thailand, the forma  on is largely determined by the central government’s poli  cal policy. 
The Thai government uses diff erent poli  cal approaches, which varies depending on the level of the 
Muslim community’s compromise in each region. In the end, the diff erences in the process of Muslim 
middle-class forma  on in these countries shaped their Muslim communi  es’ religious expressions 
both economically and poli  cally in the public sphere.
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I t dn ro uc  on
I th t d d I l hn e pas  eca e s am as 
been perceived in contradictory two    -
ysided religious expressions, namel  
intolerant or uncivilized and tolerant 
or moderate (Schønemann, 2013). 
These differing religious expressions 
are highly correlated to structural and 
social class backgrounds. The study 
of the middle class has always been 
an a  rac  ve issue among academics 
and social ac  vists, which is primarily 
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a  ributed to the fact that as a middle 
group, they come up with a strategic 
role and func  on of connec  vity and 
other intermediary in diverse poli  cal, 
economic and cultural arenas (Bagguley, 
1992). In this context, the middle class 
plays a signifi cant role as the driving 
force of social transformation owing 
to its ability to represent the interests 
of the elite class, while infl uencing the 
interests of the grass-root. 
With the benefi t of hindsight, it is 
apparent that the last decade has been 
witnessing the fascina  ng dynamics of 
the middle class, principally the Muslim 
middle class in three Southeast Asian 
countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, especially in relations 
to the changing political regime and 
economic growth in the region. Each 
country in the Southeast Asian region 
has its own unique characteris  cs of 
Muslim middle-class society with its 
own social condi  ons, which result in 
diff erent religious expressions in the 
public sphere. For instance, in areas 
where Islam is the less dominant group 
there are more widely varied behaviors, 
perspec  ves, and communal cultural 
practices than in places where Islam 
is the mainstream group (Hisyam, 
2006). These widely varied Islamic 
religious expressions are portrayed 
demonstra  vely in the public sphere.
The government plays a signifi cant 
ro l e  i n  t h e  e n co u ra ge m e nt  of 
development policies and opening 
market access, which led to the growth 
of the Muslim middle class in various 
Southeast Asian countries. This paper 
focuses on the dynamics of the Muslim 
middle class in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand through the perspec  ve of the 
government’s role and its rela  ons to 
the life of the civil society. This paper 
analyses how the Muslim community 
adapt to government-led social changes 
and how they nego  ate and resist these 
changes. Addi  onally, this paper also 
addresses how the market refl ects the 
ever-growing middle-class religious 
expression in the public sphere. 
The forma  on of the Muslim middle 
class in Indonesia is formed through 
the ever-crisscrossing force between 
the state-driven pro-market policies, 
market-driven mechanisms, and the 
development of informa  on technology 
that creates the demands of modern 
lifestyles. Meanwhile, in terms of the 
Malaysian context, the process of 
Muslim middle-class forma  on is closely 
linked to the state driven policy in 
the form of ethnicity-based policy, an 
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affirmative policy to strengthen the 
Malay ethnicity, which is iden  cal with 
their Islamic iden  ty (Neo, 2006).
For the case of the Muslim middle 
class in Thailand, the forma  on is largely 
determined by the Bangkok central 
government’s political policy. Yet, in 
contrast to the Indonesian and Malaysian 
cases, which affect the state’s Muslim 
population indiscriminately, the Thai 
government’s policy targets particular 
Muslim sub-popula  ons. As a result of 
the government’s so   power approach, 
the Muslim middle class emerged in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat. In contrast, the 
central government’s strong-arm security 
policy towards the Muslim population 
in the Pa  ani Province has limited and 
restricted the development of its Muslim 
middle class. The government’s security 
approaches in Pa  ani has le   its Muslim 
community with constraints in market 
access and business expansion.
The many social and poli  cal factors 
at play in the emergence of the Muslim 
middle class in the three Southeast 
Asian states result in a variation in 
religious expressions in the public 
sphere both poli  cally and economically. 
In other words, the crisscrossing linkage 
between Islam and the middle-class 
society intertwining one to another is 
worth studying owing to the existence 
of the pa  ern of class-consciousness 
for access ownership, capital ownership, 
and power ownership to construct the 
social trajectory (Wright, 1989).
This paper explores the social 
phenomenon that  s ign i f ies  the 
emergence of the Muslim middle class 
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and 
how is this emergence expressed in 
the public sphere. These ques  ons are 
certainly contextualized in accordance 
to diff erent poli  cal contexts of each 
country, thus generating a diverse 
response in the use of poli  cal access 
and other economic opportuni  es.  
Indonesia: The Muslim Revival in Post 
New Order
It is hard to map out the forma  on 
of a Muslim middle-class society in 
Indonesia without taking into account 
the political upheaval and capitalist 
patterns instilled in the Indonesian 
economy. Such context can be observed 
at least since the Dutch colonial  mes, 
when the Muslim middle-class traders 
established Sarekat Dagang Islam (The 
Islamic Trade Union, SDI) in the early 
1900s (Fealy & White, 2008). SDI, which 
later turned into the Sarekat Islam (The 
Islamic Union, SI) in 1921, is a socio-
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political organization founded as a 
struggle against the Dutch colonialism 
that privileged trade for the Europeans, 
Wong Tjina or the Chinese, and the local 
aristocracy (Ja  , 2017).
SI seeks to muster the Islamic forces 
to take part and fight for more just 
economy through class approach and the 
spirit of Islamist movement. The birth of 
SDI or SI marked a new chapter for Islam 
as it shi  ed from a cultural movement 
into a poli  cal movement. The downfall 
of SI subsequently led to the birth of 
other Islamic social movements, such 
as Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama 
(NU), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
(Perti), Persatuan Islam (Persis) and 
others (Romli, 2004). The post-SI Islamic 
organizations continue to develop 
a pattern of commercial networks, 
distanced from the class approach 
by seeding a so  er poli  cal-religious 
approach than the previous SI. It 
is apparent that the pattern of the 
Islamic movement they developed is 
deeply rooted from na  onalism, which 
turns out to be the ideal spirit of the 
movement to go against colonialism.
Fo l l o w i n g  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n 
independence in 1945, President 
Soekarno introduced the gBenten
(fortress) Economic Program policy 
in 1950. This policy provided the 
entrepreneurs involved in the program 
with various privileges ranging from 
import licenses, venture capital, to 
business training (Wiharja & Negara, 
2015). This policy was also set up 
as a strategy to restrict the Chinese 
businessmen who began to dominate 
the market. However, this strategy 
was deemed to be a complete failure 
because many of the recipients of the 
bank capitals did not make use of the 
loan to fi nance businesses or produc  ve 
activities, instead they preferred to 
used it for consumption rather than 
investment (Wiharja & Negara, 2015)
Soekarno finally decided to end 
the Benteng Economic Program and 
replaced it with a series of economic 
nationalistic policies in 1957. The 
new program was designated with 
three main strategies to eliminate 
foreign capitalists by nationalizing 
foreign companies, establishing state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) to manage 
na  onalized companies, and replacing 
imports with local produc  on for a self-
suffi  cient economy. Yet, similar to the 
doomed fate of the Benteng program,
these policies also faltered. Many of 
the newly established the SOEs faced 
ineffi  ciencies and mismanagement due 
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to the government’s preference towards 
putting people who were of close 
proximity to the military and poli  cal 
par  es to manage the SOEs (Robison, 
2012).  
After the 1965 crisis, Soekarno’s 
government was overthrown by the 
Soeharto-led military. The change of 
ruling power consequently led to the 
change of the economic direc  on policy. 
As a president Soeharto made a stark 
difference to Soekarno’s nationalist 
economic policies. He opened the 
doors for foreign investment, claiming 
that Indonesia shall join the network 
of international capitalism (Masitho, 
2013). This new policy fostered the 
growth of several groups of capitalist 
classes from the military, bureaucrats, 
technocrats, politicians, relatives and 
key business partners of the regime such 
as the Indonesians of Chinese descent. 
Soeharto’s New Order regime built up 
the middle class as part of a program to 
develop a new bourgeoisie to strengthen 
the country’s economic development 
process. In a sense, the Indonesian middle 
class during the New Order era was a 
class of state dependence (Robison & 
Goodman, 2013). 
During Soeharto’s New Order period, 
the indigenous capitalist class was 
classifi ed into three diff erent groups. The 
fi rst group is comprised of entrepreneurs 
who were raised by the Soekarno 
government’s nationalist economic 
policy. The second group embraces the 
bureaucrat entrepreneurs who formed 
enterprise with family-dominated private 
groups, such as Soeharto’s family. The 
third group is the newly emerging capitalist 
groups raised by poli  cal and bureaucra  c 
protec  on, such as the Kosgoro Group 
and the Sahid Group. Addi  onally, the 
New Order regime also established 
business networks with the Indonesian 
Chinese capitalist class. Among the 
Chinese business corpora  ons known to 
be close to the poli  cal bureaucrats and 
Soeharto were the Astra Group run by 
William Soerjadjaya and the Salim Group 
of Liem Sioe Liong (Borsuk & Chng, 2016). 
The New Order went on with endless 
endeavors to set up the middle class 
in the early 1990s by working hand in 
hand with Islamic groups through the 
establishment of the Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). 
The association was designated for 
intellectuals and Muslim bureaucrats to 
allow them to make contribu  on towards 
ideas for development of the country. The 
establishment of this new ins  tu  on is 
inseparable from the role of the Muslim 
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middle-class groups who were ac  vely 
involved in approaching the government 
for decision-making. Therefore, the birth 
of ICMI could be seen as a momentum of 
unity between state interests and that of 
the Islamic groups.
It is in the contention of Robert 
Hefner (1995) that the relationship 
between Soeharto and ICMI is a 
mutually benefi cial rela  onship, since 
Soeharto was in need of bureaucracy 
reinforcement whilst Muslims were 
in need of political positions in the 
government .  The government ’s 
accommoda  ve a   tude towards the 
Muslims was a  ributed to social change 
occurring since the 1980s, where 
the Muslim middle class that were 
mainly cons  tuted of intellectuals and 
entrepreneurs began to come to the 
fore. The good relationship between 
the New Order government and the 
Muslims was proven as Soeharto 
appointed some Muslim intellectuals 
to occupy some prominent posi  ons 
in the government. The mobilization 
of the Muslim middle class into the 
government then gave rise to the idiom 
of “bureaucra  c santriniza  on4” (Jurdi, 
4The term “santri” refers to Islamic students. 
Thus, the terms “bureaucratic santrinization” 
refers to how Islam has infl uenced the Indonesian 
government bureaucracy at that  me.
2013). Aside of the accommodation 
of Islamist movement by the regime, 
Soeharto also began to express his 
Islamism by making a hajj pilgrimage 
in 1991. Additionally, Golkar—the 
currently ruling party—also initiated 
mosque construc  on program in various 
regions across Indonesia. 
A  er the fall of Soeharto in 1998, 
the growth of the Muslim middle class 
in Indonesia found a new catalyst. Unlike 
the Muslim middle class of the New Order 
era, which fl ourished under state driven 
forces, the Muslim middle class during 
the Reformation era also proliferated 
through market driven mechanism. This 
period is signifi ed by the growth of the 
Muslim market phenomenon. Both the 
state driven and market driven forces 
jointly propelled the growth of the Muslim 
middle class in Indonesia at this  me. The 
state driven factor is evident in the fact 
that the old entrepreneurs of the New 
Order era remained along with the newly 
burgeoning entrepreneurs. These new 
entrepreneurs made use of the poli  cal 
opening upon the fall of Soeharto’s 
authoritarian regime also opened up 
opportuni  es for new actors to enter the 
middle class.
Soeharto’s fall has introduced an 
electoral democracy, which has allowed 
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new actors to occupy poli  cal posi  ons 
in the government. These new poli  cal 
actors opened up access to capital for 
new groups of people, which eff ec  vely 
allowed them to enter the middle 
class. Moreover, the decentraliza  on 
of power and regional autonomy in 
Indonesia marks a compelling poli  cal 
contestation between more than 
handfuls of entrepreneurs who engaged 
themselves in politics. An example 
from Yogyakarta is Herry Zudianto, a 
businessman who is closely related to 
the Muhammadiyah. Zudianto joined 
the Na  onal Mandate Party (PAN) in 
2001 and was elected as the Mayor 
of Yogyakarta for two periods through 
electoral democracy. In a similar vein, 
Hafi dh Asrom, a businessman who was 
greatly supported by the Nahdlatul 
Ulama and had an established posi  on 
within the organiza  onal structure of 
the organiza  on, also decided to enter 
poli  cs by running for the elec  on of 
the Sleman Regency in Yogyakarta in 
2000 and 2005. Despite his defeat in 
two elec  ons, he ran for the posi  on 
of a senator in the Indonesian House of 
Representa  ves and managed to secure 
the posi  on for two periods in 2004 
and 2009. In terms of business, both 
entrepreneurs run their own successful 
business groups. Ini  ally star  ng with 
garment stores, Herry Zudianto has 
expanded into the Muslim lines of 
fashion and educa  on. Likewise, Hafi dh 
Asrom started with a furniture company, 
but later on he is well known na  onwide 
for his private Islamic educa  onal brand, 
the Al-Azhar School.
Her ry Zud ianto  and  Haf idh 
Asrom provide an example of a social 
phenomenon in line with the fi nding 
of a study by Ali and Purwandi (2017) 
about the Muslim middle class in the 
Reformation era. According to their 
Survey, 59.7 % of the Muslim middle 
class is closely related to Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) mass organiza  on, followed 
by 11.0 % who admi  ed their rela  ons 
to Muhammadiyah. Meanwhile, the 
remaining 26% respondents claimed 
to have no proximity to any Islamic 
organiza  ons (Ali & Purwandi, 2017). 
The Muslim middle class’ closeness to 
NU is primarily underpinned by several 
factors, including family affiliation 
with the Nahdl iyyin,  a common 
understanding of Islamic religion with 
that of NU, and an interest in NU’s 
moderate teachings. 
Some prominent fi gures that made 
the best use of the market driven 
phenomenon and the formation of 
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the Muslim middle class, such as Yusuf 
Mansur, Pamella Sunardi and Jody 
Brotosuseno provide an interesting 
case to study. These people were born 
with self-reliant characteristics and 
stand on their own feet of ini  a  ve to 
grow given the fact that they have li  le 
access to take advantage of government 
programs in economic development. 
Their survival skills and endurance to 
develop business networks generally 
lie in their accurate foresight in reading 
market trends.
Yusuf  Mansur ’s  p rof i c iency 
in foreseeing market demand for 
easy access to sharia-based finance 
services drove him to form PayTren 
Payment Gateway and PayTren Asset 
Management,  which are sharia-
compliant web-based payment service 
and asset management company. In his 
view, there is an attractive prospect 
for sharia compliant fi nancial business 
to thrive given the demand from the 
Muslim middle-class market. This is 
evidenced from the number of PayTren 
Payment applica  on users who have 
amounted to 1.6 million with electricity 
transac  ons of 800,000 each month 
(Laucereno, 2017). In addi  on, other 
major transac  ons are the purchase of 
credits as well as train and plane  ckets.
A n ot h e r  e nt re p re n e u r  w h o 
harnessed the opportunities in the 
Muslim market is Nurhaya   Subakat, a 
cosme  c entrepreneur who established 
Wardah, a halal  cosmetic brand. 
Wardah’s success is not contained in 
the local market, but it also sprawled 
the international market. Nurhayati 
has foreseen the promising market 
poten  als of halal goods in Indonesia 
along with the increasing cosmetic 
consump  on. Survey Results of Panel 
Service Nielsen Indonesia in 2013 (The 
Jakarta Post, 2013) shows that the 
use of cosme  cs is mainly a  ributed 
to the fact that more people realize 
the importance of retaining the look 
of beauty despite the rise in prices 
of cosmetic products. The make-up 
awareness trend is not only fl ourishing 
in urban areas, but also thriving in the 
remote areas in Indonesia.
The success of Yusuf Mansur’s 
sharia compliant fi nancial services and 
Nurhayati Subakat’s halal cosmetics 
shows how the Indonesian Muslim 
middle class’s consumption pattern 
reflects their faith and economic 
prosperity. As Carla Jones posits, 
religious goods can be used as a 
signifi er of class mobility (2007). Aside 
of the fi nancial services and the beauty 
103
IKAT: The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Social Studies Vol. 3(1), 2019
industry Islamic infl uence has also found 
its way in other sectors as refl ected in 
the prolifera  on of Islamic educa  on, 
Islamic fashion, Islamic entertainment, 
and halal tourism (Fealy, 2008).
Malaysia: Affi  rma  ve Policy as Malay 
Muslim’s Privilege
From the colonial  mes un  l the 
independence in 1957, the popula  on 
in Malaysia has always been classifi ed 
based on ethnicity (Nagaraj et al., 2015). 
The predominant ethnic group is Malay, 
which is identically correlated with 
the indigenous and Islamic identity. 
This ethnic population composition 
is also seen in the structure of work, 
for instance the distribu  on of income 
in Malaysia can be delineated upon 
ethnicity (Guan, 2002). The economic 
structure and composition of these 
ethnically based popula  ons indicates 
the economically backward Malay 
in comparison to the Malaysians of 
Chinese descent. This situation led 
to social jealousy and tension, which 
eventually burst into anger and riots 
between the Malay and Malay Chinese 
on May 31, 1969. The ethnic unrest in 
1969 was the culmina  on of the Malay 
dissa  sfac  on for experiencing long-
term poli  cal discontent due to socio-
economic dispari  es that led to social 
segrega  on in the society. In order to 
avoid such riots from recurring, the 
Malaysian government tried to improve 
social harmony and promote na  onal 
unity by enacting ethnicity based 
economic policies, which priori  zes the 
Malays (Afzal, 2018). The New Economic 
Policy (NEP) was eventually adopted in 
1971 as a response to the problem. NEP 
delineates two things: reducing poverty 
by raising the level of people’s income 
through job opportunity enlargement 
and accelerating the process of the 
Malaysian society restructuring in 
establishing an economic balance. 
The NEP became the basis for the 
orientation of the industrialization 
policy in Malaysia (Talib, 2000).
The Malaysian Federal Cons  tu  on 
stipulates that the bumiputra, which 
comprise of Malays and na  ves of Sabah 
and Sarawak, may obtain privileged 
access to public-sector jobs, enterprise 
licenses, rent opportuni  es, government 
contracts, scholarships and entry to 
public universi  es (Balasubramaniam, 
2007). The bumiputra classification 
eff ec  vely excluded the ethnic Chinese, 
Indians and other nonindigenous 
peoples of Malaysia from these 
privileges. The classification, which 
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favors the bumiputra, is refl ected in the 
Malaysian government’s NEP.
To encourage the participation of 
the Malays in the economy, in 1978 the 
government established the Bumiputra 
Investment Foundation, to strengthen 
bumiputra’s capital ownership. Through 
the establishment of the Industrial 
Coordination Act, the state organizes 
the industry, while at the same time 
encouraging the bumiputras’ involvement 
in the development of Malaysian industry. 
The same reason also applies for the 
establishment of the Outline Perspec  ve 
Plan One where the state promotes 
equitable economic distribution, 
economic restructuring, employment 
distribu  on, and the ownership of internal 
aspects of corporate sectors for the 
Malays. As for the improvement of 
science and skills of the    bumiputra, the 
government established the Rida Training 
Center and Mara College (now known as 
Universi   Technology MARA or UiTM).
The NEP policy which was designed 
for a span of 20 years does not only 
regulate the primary sector, but also 
seeks ways to reduce regional dispari  es 
between ethnicities and to raise the 
incomes, education and health care 
of the Malays (Hansen et al., 1990). 
Amongst other privileges provided 
to the Malays are the subsidy for the 
construc  on of simple homes for the 
low-income society of below RM 5,000 
per month, scholarships for educa  on 
at home and abroad, and the provision 
of 10 acres of land for Malays who 
migrate to new industrial areas, and 
the establishment of Bumiputra small 
business union.
The provision of the NEP as 
the first wave of the government’s 
policy revolution had three impacts. 
Firstly, the government bureaucracy 
becomes predominantly controlled 
by the Malays. Secondly, the Malay 
professionals increasingly grew in 
various fi elds. Finally, the number of 
Malay owned enterprise also grew. 
The next step that that marked the 
second wave of policy revolu  on was 
the Na  onal Development Plans (NDP) 
in 1990s. This second wave of policy 
revolu  on is signifi ed by the globalized 
ymarket economy, government subsid  
reduction, and the growing Muslim 
Malay middle class across all sectors.
Instead of focusing on ethic-based 
policies like the fi rst policy revolu  on 
wave, the NDP, focuses on state-
dependent affirmative policy toward 
privatization. This policy continued 
to apply until the 2020 policy plan, 
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namely Malaysia’s Multimedia Super 
Corridor and Vision 2020 (MSC). The 
NDP and MSC policies open up private 
market opportuni  es and slightly lessen 
bumiputra’s privileges. The state’s 
business policy vision is designed to 
make Malaysia an advanced industrial 
economy of large and medium-scale 
industries and to reform its citizens’ 
way of life in the globalized world 
(Mohammad, 1991).   
The projects within MSC included 
the development of Kuala Lumpur City 
Center (KLCC) luxury commercial tower, 
Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
(KLIA), and the na  onal sports industry 
complex. The state also boosted palm 
oil planta  ons under the coordina  on 
of the Land and Development Authority. 
Additionally, the government also 
developed Putra Jaya to serve as a 
new administra  ve center and Cyber 
Jaya as a new center of commerce and 
technology. 
Both the NDP and MSC facilitated the 
growth of the Malay intellectual middle 
class that increasingly spread in various 
professions, such as businessmen, 
engineers, managers, doctors, and other 
professional competencies. The success 
of the country’s industrial policy and the 
increasingly high level of ethnic Malay 
educa  on created an increasing urban 
fl ow from rural to urban areas annually 
(Thillainathan & Cheong, 2016). The 
success of the state’s industrial policy 
also improved the level of life of the 
Malays (Lall, 1995). In other words, it is 
possible to assume that the investment 
of the country, through scholarships 
and access to education quotas for 
the Malays in the fi rst wave of policy 
revolu  on has spawned the explosion of 
professionals in various fi elds, whilst the 
government’s development projects in 
the second wave of the policy revolu  on 
have further created the demand for 
these professionals.
Despite the Malay’s social mobility, 
the Malaysian middle class is also said 
to suff er due to the country’s economic 
policies in the second wave of policy 
revolu  on. For instance, various subsidies 
introduced in the first wave of policy 
revolution were limited to people in 
the lower social class. This change was 
deemed necessary to catch up with 
the market economy. Such condition 
has led the state-dependent Muslim 
middle class to suffer as they have to 
strive more independently without the 
state’s support. Addi  onally, they are also 
faced with subsidy cuts amidst the ever-
demanding new middle-class lifestyle. 
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The expression of the middle-class 
Malay Muslims in the public space 
provides no less interesting topical 
issue since their mobility is apparent 
from the rise of Islamic symbols in 
the public sphere. The Muslim middle 
class carries Islam with them as a class 
iden  ty, signifying Malaysia’s image as 
a country of a predominantly Muslim 
population. The religious expression 
as seen from Islamic life styles can be 
observed in three important ways: the 
existence of the state sharia policy, the 
emergence of the Muslim market, and 
Islamic philanthropy.
Firstly, the state’s sharia policies have 
accommodated the growth of religious 
expression in the business sphere. In 
1993 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), 
the central bank, allowed conven  onal 
banks to operate Islamic “windows” 
under the Interest-free Banking Scheme 
(Ariff , 2017). Ini  ally, the three largest 
conven  onal banks in Malaysia, which 
were Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, 
Malayan Banking and United Malayan 
Banking Corpora  on were given license 
to operate Islamic windows. By the end of 
1993, there were already 21 conven  onal 
banks with Islamic windows. 
S e co n d l y,  I s l a m i c  re l i g i o u s 
expression may also be observed 
through the Muslim market mechanism. 
For instance, the Muslim middle class’ 
preference to consume halal food 
and products may be observed across 
different sectors. For instance, the 
growth of salons and beauty products 
with halal label refl ect this the Muslim 
middle class’ consump  on pa  ern. Some 
products such as Sendayu Tinggi, A  ka 
Beauty, Nouvelles Visages, De ‘face, 
Maintainability Anis’ s beauty, the Large 
Wave, Jelita Ayu, Biodex, World Herb, 
D’Navechee and Yusmira Cosmetics, 
are among the most sought after by 
the Muslim middle class in Malaysia 
(Yacoob & Azmi, 2012).  They also 
yearn for other Islamic products, such 
as Islamic teaching, Qur’anic reading 
classes, Islamic TV broadcasts, Islamic 
magazines, Islamic fi lms, and hijabs with 
all of its accessories. The halalness of 
products and its consump  on cultures 
becomes what Johan Fischer deem a 
part of the narra  ve of the awareness 
of Islam and the class inherent in the 
Muslims’ everyday iden  ty (2008). 
When it comes to the desire to 
consume Islamic ideas, there are some 
popular Islamic preachers such as 
Ustadz Mohd Fadzillah Kamsah, a 
well-known preacher and motivator 
on television and the social media, or 
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Ustadz Mohammad Kazim Elias, who 
is widely praised for his comical style. 
Addi  onally, the Muslim middle class 
in Malaysia also has the op  on to send 
their children to Islamic private schools 
or tahfi dz (Quran memoriza  on) schools. 
Some famous schools in this line are the 
Raudah Islamic School in Kajang, and 
Darul Huff az Interna  onal Tahfi z and 
Science Academy, which operates many 
branches across Malaysia.
The third observable religious 
expression in Malaysia is Islamic 
philanthropy. The religious expression 
in this context is primarily organized 
through surau—a worship place such as 
mosque—for example An-Nur Welfare 
Associa  on or PKIAN (Hasan, 2000). 
The state also plays an important role 
in the philanthropic aspect for the 
middle class by imposing a monthly 
salary deduc  on for all employees for 
zakah charity by 2.5%. The deduc  on 
termed as Skim Thohir was handed 
over to the Tax Collection Center 
(PPZ), which was inaugurated by the 
Regional Islamic Council (Majlis Agama 
Islam Wilayah Persekutuan). Malaysian 
Muslims generally prefer to distribute 
their zakah through these organiza  ons 
rather than as individual donations. 
Some of the trusted organiza  ons are 
the IKRAM Malaysia and the Malaysian 
Muslim Associa  on (ISMA). Thus, the 
philanthropic aspect in Malaysia does 
not rely much on individual culture as 
the prime mover. 
Thailand: Muslim is Not Only about 
Pa  ani 
The existence of Islam in Thailand 
has mainly been represented by the 
Muslims Pa  ani, Yala, and Narathiwat 
provinces, which constantly suff er from 
marginaliza  on. Nevertheless, seeing 
Islam in Thailand only through the 
three provinces would be too narrow 
to describe the full picture of Muslims 
in Thailand who are sca  ered and in 
various regions. The Thai Muslims are 
remarkably adaptable to cope with 
the demands of  me, to compromise 
with global infl uences, and to cleverly 
establish new iden   es without giving 
up their original beliefs and iden   es. 
One of such provinces displaying such 
characteris  cs is Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
a province in the Southern part of 
Thailand.
According to the researchers’ 
observa  on, in Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
the government provides its Muslim 
community with access to public 
facili  es and treatment like ci  zens of 
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other religions. In daily life, the local 
people deem Muslims as good and 
of “high ranked class” ci  zens, which 
consequently allows the Muslims a 
room to hold their ac  vi  es normally. 
For instance, Muslims in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat are provided with access 
to both religious educa  on in boarding 
schools and formal school educa  on. 
This situation is in contrast to the 
Muslims in Pa  ani, which have a limited 
access to educa  on that led to poor 
human resources quality in the region. 
The Thai government treats the Muslim 
community in Pa  ani—another province 
in the Southern part of Thailand—
differently from those in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat. In Pa  ani the police and 
military always cast a suspicious look 
at them and their daily ac  vi  es were 
disrupted by the countless checkpoints 
that must be passed.
Historically southern Thailand is 
marred with an ongoing conflict. It 
originated in 1948 as an ethnic and 
religious separa  st insurgency in the 
historical Malay Pattani Region in 
the three southernmost provinces of 
Thailand (Islam, 1998). To curb the 
insurgency the government a  empted 
to legalize the military’s presence in 
Pa  ani by enac  ng three laws, which 
are the Mar  al Act Law of 1914, the 
Emergency Decree of 2005, and the 
Domes  c Security Act of 2008. Under 
those prevailing three laws, a soldier or 
police offi  cer is in charge of supervising 
100 civilians. With such a legal structure, 
the military is fully authorized to carry 
out ac  ons such as unauthorized arrest, 
rshoo  ng people deemed suspicious o  
dangerous, and to have legal immunity 
in doing so.
In terms of local poli  cs, Muslims 
in Nakhon Si Thammarat are given 
relatively wide access through three 
representa  ves in provincial councils, 
which are selected through electoral 
democracy. This is in line with the 
Decentralization Act of 1997, which 
provides a cons  tu  onal mandate in 
local elections. Electoral democracy 
provides an opportunity for Muslims 
to become public figures in Nakhon 
Si Thammarat. This is attributed to 
the modern political transformation 
of Thailand, which began to develop 
in 1932, which limited the power of 
the Thai monarchy in the name of 
democracy. The Thai democracy gives 
rise to political access not only to 
Muslims at the local level, but also at a 
na  onal and even an interna  onal level. 
For instance, Surin Pitsuwan whose 
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poli  cal career skyrocketed where he 
was appointed as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in 1997 and the secretary-
general of ASEAN since 2006 becomes 
an evidence of the monumental 
achievement of Malay descent Muslims 
in Nakhon Si Thammarat. His successful 
political career consequently raised 
the pride for the Malay descent 
Muslim community in the province. It 
is in contrast to Pa  ani, which despite 
having a propor  onately larger Muslim 
popula  on than Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
only has one representative in the 
provincial council are not provided with 
access to electoral democracy since a 
representa  ve is directly appointed by 
the central government.
By looking at the amalgama  on of 
social and local poli  cal representa  on, 
it is apparent that the government has 
adopted two diff erent approaches to 
deal with the Muslim in two diff erent 
regions. In Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
the government uses soft power by 
opening various accesses for the Muslim 
community to ensure a normal life as 
any other Thai ci  zens. On the other 
hand, in Pa  ani the government shows 
a strong hand through the use of military 
controls and restricts the movement of 
the Muslim community. Yet, instead of 
s  fl ing the insurgency in the region, the 
controls and restric  ons only triggered 
social resistance, which results in further 
poli  cal instability.
The diff erence in policy approaches 
and the level of access disclosure further 
led to different economic growth in 
both provinces. The peaceful condi  on 
in Nakhon Si Thammarat allows the 
Muslim community to participate in 
the economy without any constrains. 
This is evidenced through the rapid 
growth of Muslim-owned businesses, 
especially in the culinary, hospitality, 
marine, automotive and property 
sectors (Interview with Arafat and 
Haji Shugur, Local businessman of 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, October 10, 
2017). Under the prime ministership of 
Thaksin Shinawatra, the government 
increasingly opens economic access 
for the Muslim community and plays a 
major role in boos  ng their economic 
growth, particularly by facilitating 
the establishment of Islamic Bank of 
Thailand (I-Bank). Interes  ngly, it turns 
out that I-Bank customers are not only 
limited to the Muslim community, but 
it also provides services for the general 
public.
In addi  on to capital provision from 
I-Bank, Al-Muslimoon cooperative, 
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which was established in 2001, also 
become an option for Muslims. Al-
Muslimoon ini  ally only raised funds 
from the Muslim community in the 
township level, which then grew over 
time and began to embrace a larger 
number of members. The coopera  ve, 
which mainly operate in the rural area, 
also contributed to improving the 
Muslim community’s welfare by serving 
Malay descent Muslims living below the 
poverty line. 
The opening of access to the capital 
in Nakhon the Thammarat carries a 
positive impact marked by widening 
opportuni  es for job vacancies in the 
enterprise sector, the declining poverty 
rate, and the increasing income of the 
Muslim community. The access to 
capital greatly contributes towards the 
restructuring of Nakhon Si Thammarat 
Muslims in establishing economic 
balance and elimina  ng the jus  fi ca  on 
of prosperity based on ethnicity and 
religion. It inevitably led to accelerated 
growth of a new Muslim middle 
class with the continuous growth of 
entrepreneurs. Despite their economic 
emergence, the Muslims in Nakhon SI 
Thammarat is faced with the fact that 
land in the province is mainly owned by 
Thai Chinese ci  zens.  Therefore, it is 
impossible for the Muslim entrepreneurs 
to f ight them through a frontal 
compe   on, instead they will have to 
adapt to an economic sharing to gain 
access to capital market for a greater 
profi t. This means that to counter the 
Thai Chinese ethnic hegemony, the only 
possible way for Muslims is to posi  on 
themselves as business partners instead 
of compe  tors, because otherwise the 
Muslims will certainly lose out of the 
fi nancial and networking opportuni  es.
This is in contrast to Pattani, in 
which the grip of access restriction 
in various fields has slackened local 
economic growth. Instead of crea  ng 
a sense of safety, the state, through 
their vigorous control as represented 
by the police and military pressure of 
surveillance in the city corners, has 
led to the feeling of insecurity. The 
only vibrant economic heartbeat is 
most visibly detected in the heart of 
Pattani City; in Charoenpradit Road 
with its boisterous economic ac  vi  es. 
However, the further from the main 
road, there will be a sense of economic 
depriva  on, especially a  er 9 PM local 
 me when the atmosphere becomes 
increasingly tense. It is impossible for 
the local communi  es to conduct their 
ac  vi  es outside the house since the 
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curfew, where viola  ons will only lead 
to military interroga  on and arrest. 
Amidst the situa  on, the government 
offered help by trying to open access 
through a skill training program called 
klummaeban, which is training aid as 
a part of One Thambon One Product 
(OTOP) program. The OTOP program 
aims to increase the output of micro, 
small and medium enterprises throughout 
Thailand. At fi rst the Muslim community 
welcomed the training program, but 
gradually most of the people decided to 
leave it because klummaeban ac  vi  es 
were o  en deemed incompa  ble with the 
culture of the Malay Thais. An example 
is the absence of praying time during 
training.  The decision of the community 
to abandon the klummaeban program 
certainly affected their income. Yet, 
despite their loss of income from the 
government they still prefer to stop 
par  cipa  ng in the program. Those who 
stopped participating prefers to seek 
other sources of income rather than 
exchanging their religious principles with 
government rules. However, it appears 
that lack of capital and lack of skills make 
it diffi  cult for them to benefi t from other 
sources of income. 
Despite having more options in 
terms of access to capital than Muslims in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, the Pa  ani Muslim 
community s  ll falters economically. If 
in Nakhon Si Thammarat the Muslim 
community relies solely on I-Bank and 
Al-Muslimoon Cooperative, in Pattani 
besides I-Bank there are two coopera  ves 
that are bigger in terms of membership 
than Al-Muslimoon, which are the Ibnu 
Aff an and Pa  ani Muslim Coopera  ve. 
While both Ibnu Affan and Pattani 
Muslim Cooperative are well received 
by the Muslims who keenly come to 
seek capital, unfortunately, there are 
various obstacles hindering the growth 
of the two coopera  ves. Some of them 
are the lack of knowledge or social 
understanding and unclear legal basis 
for Islamic cooperative establishment. 
Moreover, Pattani Muslims are also 
reluctant to access capital from I-Bank as 
they see the I-Bank as a representa  on of 
the central government. In other words, 
Nakhon Si Thammarat Muslims are more 
accustomed to using modern fi nancial 
systems, which inevitably engenders 
better economic conditions for them, 
and on the other hand the Muslims in 
Pattani are not as well accustomed in 
using modern banking fi nancial system, 
which slackens their economic growth. 
As seen from the class forma  on, 
Muslims in Nakhon Si Thammarat 
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are pre  y apt at aligning themselves 
soc ia l ly with  other ethnic i t ies . 
However, economically they are still 
incomparable with the Thai Chinese 
citizens in terms of the amount of 
deposit in the I- Bank. The rise of 
Muslim life is primarily infl uenced by 
the suppor  ve government policies that 
provide them with access and facili  es 
towards educa  on and capital, which is 
welcomed by the entrepreneurial spirit 
of Muslims in Nakhon Si Thammarat. 
Thus, it is possible to assume that the 
growth of the Muslim middle class in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat is underpinned by 
the mee  ng between state driven and 
market driven factors in a produc  ve 
spirit. In contrast, the middle-class 
ci  zens in Pa  ani predominantly are 
Thai Chinese, while the Muslim Malay 
middle class is le   with li  le room to 
thrive. This is principally engendered by 
government policies that restrict access 
for Muslims and are aggravated by the 
Pa  ani Muslims’ withdrawal from viable 
economic opportunities themselves, 
which is evidenced by their reluctance 
to access the capital from ins  tu  ons 
using modern banking systems and their 
exit from the klummaeban programs.
Differences in the condit ion 
between the Muslim community in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat and Pa  ani as 
explained above resulted in a direct 
impact on the level of welfare and 
growth of their middle class. The next 
ques  on to answer is how the diverse 
Muslim middle-class trajectory is 
expressed in the public sphere. So far, 
the level of prosperity is closely related 
to one’s lifestyle and this is also true in 
Thailand. The Thai middle class is closely 
associated with their high incomes and 
consump  ve culture, and they desire 
to express their religious identity in 
the public sphere. It appears that in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, the Muslim 
middle class is thriving because they 
are supported by wide access that spurs 
the accelera  on of economic growth. 
However, the Muslim middleclass in this 
province do not necessarily use up their 
income for pleasure or lifestyle. They 
also do not crave to display their Islamic 
iden  ty in the public sphere. They prefer 
to use their income or business profi ts 
to raise and expand their businesses. In 
fact, some of their income is allocated to 
help other fellow Muslim businesses. In 
early 2017, several Muslim businessmen 
ini  ated the establishment of Nakhon 
Si Thammarat Muslim Business Club 
(NMBC) to bridge and unite Muslim 
businesses ranging from small scale to 
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large scale in an associa  on in order to 
strengthen the businesses.
The situa  on in Nakhin Si Thammarat 
is quite the reverse with Muslims 
Pa  ani. Despite the economic hardship 
they suff er from, the Muslims in Pa  ani 
are always craving for excessive Islamic 
iden  ty and prosperity. Wearing Islamic 
clothes makes them feel elated as they 
feel a sense of pride as Malay Muslims 
as well as self-confi dence as a Muslim 
who keeps up with the latest trend or 
contemporary fashion. In Pa  ani, it is 
deemed important to display religious 
expression in everyday life. It is primarily 
because the Pa  ani Muslim would like 
others to get an impression that they are 
wealthy through their outfi ts, despite 
the fact that they are economically 
impoverished. It is as if the only way 
to express their resistance against the 
government no ma  er how hard the 
repressive measures, no matter how 
restricted their access towards many 
things are, Muslims in Pa  ani will remain 
strong and fi ght back. It is essen  al for 
them to maintain their dignity as Malay 
Muslims. In other words, to put it in 
brief, in Pattani, religious expression 
is visible through the way the people 
dress in luxury, which sets as a symbol 
of resistance in the public sphere.
Conclusion
Taking heed on Indonesia, the state 
once enacted a policy in favor of the 
growth of the Muslim middle class through 
the Benteng economic program. However, 
it turned out that the program failed. 
During president Soeharto’s New Order 
period, the state developed a pa  ern of 
capitalism that further encouraged the 
middle-class growth in the president’s 
crony circle, be it among the bureaucracy, 
technocrats, bureaucracy, poli  cians and 
their own kin. However, it turned out 
that the New Order regime has failed to 
embrace the Muslim communal power 
while the urban Muslims continued 
to blossom and boom in the process 
of Muslim market reinforcement.  As 
seen from the context of the political 
reform, it is clear that electoral democracy 
and regional autonomy policies have 
supported the growth of the Muslim 
middle class in many ci  es. Some people 
have managed to come to the fore by 
running for public office positions in 
the government through the political 
opening aff orded by electoral democracy. 
Meanwhile, others may fi nd themselves 
independently struggleing for success 
by  seizing opportuni  es in the Muslim 
market through the monetization of 
Islamic lifestyle.
114
Abdur Rozaki, Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma, Abd. Aziz Faiz
In Malaysia,  the government 
issued NEP as the first wave policy 
revolution with the primary aim to 
strengthen the na  onal capital of the 
Malay bumiputra who are iden  cal to 
Muslims. To strengthen the bumiputras’ 
access in state industry, the government 
established the Industrial Co-ordina  on 
Act and the BCIC. Aside of these 
policies, the government also aided 
the improvement of the Malays’ human 
resources by establishing new higher 
education institutions and assigning 
a certain quota for them. Another 
affi  rma  ve policy for the Malays is the 
ease in accessing jobs, housing and land 
in the country’s new industrial land areas. 
The second wave of policy revolu  on 
moves from focusing on ethnic-based 
affi  rma  ve policies to the NEP in the 
1990s, which lessens the bumiputra’s 
privileges but supports priva  za  on. In 
this stage, the focus on infrastructure 
development and affirmative policy 
towards privatization diversifies the 
Malay Muslim’s profession, who are at 
this point already benefi ted from the 
affirmative policy on the first policy 
revolution. The rise of the Muslim 
middle class in Malaysia was driven 
by the state as is indicated by the fi rst 
and second policy revolutions. The 
rapid growth of the Malay Muslim 
middle class is attributed to several 
interconnected factors namely the 
ethnicity-based policies, the intellectual 
mobility and the global market. The 
religious expression of the Muslim 
middle class in public sphere can be 
see through the state’s sharia policies, 
the consump  on of Islamic goods, and 
Islamic philanthropy.
The Muslim middle class in Southern 
Thailand has been hindered to grow 
independently despite market forces and 
opportuni  es off ered by digital economic 
advancements. As the military took 
control over civilian poli  cs in the region, 
the situa  on exacerbated the already 
prickly political condition of Muslims 
in the insurgency-ridden provinces, 
such as in Pa  ani, Yala and Narathiwat. 
The Muslim in these provinces suff ers 
from the government’s “hard power” 
policies and militaristic approach 
instead of seeing welfare-based policy 
approaches. Under the military poli  cal 
pressure, it is hard for the Muslims to 
prosper economically in these three 
predominantly Muslim provinces. The 
 ght poli  cal control, which inevitably 
limits economic opportuni  es, hinders 
economic prosperity and the rise of the 
Muslim middle class. In contrast to the 
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Muslim community in Pa  ani, in the case 
of Muslims in Nakhon Si Thammarat 
Province, the so   poli  cal power that 
the central government applied has 
provided Muslims with wider access 
to education, banking, employment 
and other economic opportunities 
which accordingly assures a conducive 
atmosphere for the growth of its Muslim 
middle class.
The development paradigm and 
political policy of a country greatly 
shaped the dynamics of the Muslim 
middle-class development in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand. While both the 
Indonesian and Malaysian government 
resorted to affi  rma  ve policy towards 
the Muslims, which allowed the Muslim 
middle class to prosper, in Thailand the 
government took a more diversified 
approach as a response to local Muslim 
community insurgency. As a result 
of a more diversifi ed policy, diff erent 
regions in Thailand saw diff erent levels 
of prosperity amongst their Muslim 
communities. The different patterns 
in governmental approach towards 
development policies in these three 
Southeast Asian countries results in a 
varia  on of Muslim middle-class growth 
trajectories and their eventual Islamic 
expressions in the public sphere.
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